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Abstract 
Computer vision research aimed at performing general scene understanding has proven 
to be conceptually difficult and computationally complex. Active vision is a promising 
approach to solving this problem. Active vision systems use optimized sensor settings, 
reduced fields of view, and relatively simple algorithms to efficiently extract specific 
information from a scene. This approach is only appropriate in the context of a task that 
motivates the selection of the information to extract. While there has been a fair amount of 
research that describes the extraction processes, there has been little work that investigates 
how active vision could be used for a realistic task in a dynamic domain. We are studying 
such a task: driving an autonomous vehicle in traffic. 
In this paper we present a method for controlling visual attention as part of the 
reasoning process for driving, and analyze the efficiency gained in doing so. We first 
describe a model of driving and the driving environment, and estimate the complexity of 
performing the required sensing with a general driving-scene understanding system. We 
then introduce three programs that use increasingly sophisticated perceptual control 
techniques to select perceptual actions. The first program, called Ulysses-l, uses perceptual 
routines, which use known reference objects to guide the search for new objects. The 
second program, Ulysses-2, creates an inference tree to infer the effect of uncertain input 
data on action choices, and searches this tree to decide which data to sense. Finally, 
Ulysses-3 uses domain knowledge to reason about how dynamic objects will move or 
change over time; objects that do not move enough to affect the robot’s decisions are not 
selected as perceptual targets. For each technique we have run experiments in simulation 
to measure the cost savings realized by using selective perception. We estimate that the 
techniques included in Ulysses-3 reduce the computational cost of perception by 9 to 12 
orders of magnitude when compared to a general perception system. 
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1. Introduction 
I. 1. The need to control perceptuul attentiorl 
Early mobile robot research concentrated on making a robot solve problems. 
These problems were expressed in symbolic form, having already been abstracted 
away from the real world. Computer vision research has attempted to match this 
view of a robot by developing general systems that can build complete symbolic 
descriptions of arbitrary scenes. This vision task has proven to be extremely 
difficult to accomplish, and when it is possible it is often at great computational 
cost. More recently, activr vision has been seen as a more feasible way to provide 
robots with the information they need to solve problems. Active vision systems do 
not completely characterize the entire scene, but instead optimize sensor parame- 
ters, the field of view. and algorithms to extract specific information from the 
scene. Such vision systems depend on an external task to determine what 
information is needed. 
We believe that active perception is essential for a mobile robot performing a 
complex task in a dynamic environment. In addition to choosing actions, a 
controller for such a robot must select perceptual actions to get information 
needed to perform the task. Thus perception and action selection should be 
indistinguishable parts of the same control function. In our research we have 
developed a robot control program that integrates perception and action selec- 
tion. The program, called Ulysses, drives a simulated robot in traffic-a task that 
is fairly complex, in an environment that is dynamic and visually complex. Driving 
knowledge is encoded in such a way that Ulysses can reason about it to select an 
efficient set of perceptual actions. Ulysses considers how traffic objects could 
affect its choice of actions, requests appropriate sensory data, and commands 
maneuvers. Ulysses currently operates in a world provided by a detailed traffic 
simulator we developed called PHAROS; PHAROS simulates the perceptual 
actions and carries out the maneuvers. PHAROS also controls the other vehicles 
in the environment. 
The central themes of this paper are illustrated by the following example. 
Consider the driving scene shown in Fig. 1. It shows a robot driving through a 
scene containing vehicles in various locations and poses. To recognize an arbitrary 
vehicle, a perception system would have to consider variations in vehicle shape, 
color. and illumination, as well as anomalies due to surface markings, reflections, 
transparent surfaces, occlusions, etc. The vehicles are different distances and 
directions from the robot, and so appear in different locations in the robot’s 
image of the scene. A perception system attempting to find all vehicles in the 
scene would have to search all possible locations, ranges, and poses. To interpret 
the scene completely. the perception system would also have to locate and 
identify all other traffic objects, with similar variations. The combinatorics of all 
of these factors together make such exhaustive perception far too expensive for a 
robot driver to do in a dynamic situation. Even humans cannot do this. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary for a robot driver to update its world mode1 
completely. Although traffic objects may be found in many locations throughout a 
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Fig. 1. A driving scene. 
scene, it is wasteful to look for all of them because they are not all important to 
the robot. As the robot considers the various physical limitations, traffic rules, 
etc. that affect its choice of actions, it can look for relevant 
appropriate areas. Fig. 2 illustrates this limited visual search. 
1.2. Driving and sensing with Ulysses 
objects in the 
The Ulysses driving program represents driving knowledge well enough to 
allow Ulysses to understand many complex traffic situations and select safe 
actions. Driving knowledge also allows Ulysses to reason about perception and 
select perceptual actions. We present three specific methods for controlling 
perception. These methods have been implemented incrementally in three 
programs: Ulysses-l, -2 and -3. 
(1) The Ulysses driving model encodes driving rules as a set of constraints and 
preferences. Constraints limit the robot’s choice of actions to safe maneuv- 
ers. The preferences allow Ulysses to choose among safe maneuvers to 
further some objective. The constraints and preferences are represented 
explicitly as an inference tree with sense inputs on the bottom and an 
Fig. 2. Selective visual search, 
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action output at the top. The tree acts as a constraint network through 
which uncertain input values propagate to yield ranges of possible actions. 
(2) Ulysses-l looks only in the appropriate parts of the scene for traffic objects 
instead of looking everywhere. Ulysses-l uses task-dependent perceptual 
operators called perceptual routines to narrow its search area. The routines 
make use of the fact that the meaning of traffic objects depends on their 
spatial relations to other objects (e.g., the closest car ahead in this lane). 
The routines search for objects only near specific reference objects. 
(3) Ulysses-2 constrains search areas and also tries to find the minimum set of 
objects necessary to determine the correct action. Although Ulysses-l uses 
knowledge of the traffic environment to constrain where it looks for 
objects, it does not consider the current situation to determine which 
objects are really important. Ulysses-2 reasons using the inference tree to 
determine the most critical input, and calls the appropriate perceptual 
routine to get the required data. The new information propagates up the 
tree to constrain possible actions. This selection and sensing process is 
repeated until there is no uncertainty about what action should be taken. 
(4) Ulysses-3 uses the same mechanism used in Ulysses-2 but also maintains a 
persistent world model. Facts in the model are time-stamped, and Ulysses- 
3 uses domain knowledge to reason about how object characteristics 
change over time. The inference tree reasoning process automatically 
determines when changing objects must be sensed again to reduce uncer- 
tainty. 
In this paper we first present an estimate of the complexity of perception for 
driving to demonstrate why it is necessary for a driving robot to actively focus its 
perceptual attention. We then describe the encoding of the driving task and the 
three perceptual reasoning techniques used in Ulysses. The impact of this 
reasoning is estimated experimentally by running Ulysses in various traffic 
situations and measuring the simulated cost of its perceptual actions. 
1.3. Related work 
1.3.1. Active vision 
The attention control that Ulysses performs is one aspect of active computer 
vision. Active vision comprises at least two levels of attention control, however. 
At a high level, active vision involves deciding which parts of the scene are most 
important for the robot to be looking at given its task. This is the level that this 
paper addresses. Our system considers where to look from a given viewpoint, 
rather than where to move a viewpoint. At a lower level, active vision concerns 
gaze stabilization, pointing control for object tracking, verging stereo, camera- 
hand coordination, automatic focus, camera motion and localized optical flow, 
etc. [5, 71. Ulysses doesn’t consider any of these issues, but does borrow the 
concept of perceptual routines from the lower-level visual routines of Ullman [65]. 
We will discuss routines more in Section 4. 
The need to focus perceptual attention has been addressed in a basic way in 
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many systems. Various planners have incorporated sensing operations into plans 
to find specific objects so that uncertainty could be reduced or operator 
preconditions verified [14, 251. These systems focus attention statically, and are 
not suitable for a dynamic domain like driving. Hayes-Roth’s patient monitoring 
system [38] reasons about computational resource limitations and adjusts jilters to 
reduce the data flow from the sensors. While they are effective in applications 
with simple sensory processing requirements, filters are too simplistic for robotics 
applications. 
A number of robot systems have used task knowledge to limit visual searches to 
small portions of the scene. Mobile robots have used these small “windows” so 
that they have less data to process when looking for signs or other objects [4, 36, 
44, 631. These systems require only minimal intelligent perception control 
though, since their tasks require that the robot always look for the same object in 
about the same place-for example, monitoring a lane line or watching for speed 
limit signs. Burt [15] also advocates using small windows, but with the ability to 
move around the image to probe interesting areas. However, Burt did not present 
specific methods for choosing where the windows should be placed. 
Ulysses’ use of reference objects to identify and limit search regions dy- 
namically draws on the techniques used by other researchers for efficient object 
detection [13, 31, 49, 601. In these systems a domain-specific model describes 
spatial relationships between objects. After a hypothesis has been formed from 
information detected in one part of the image, the spatial relationships can 
indicate an effective place to look to confirm or refute the hypothesis. Garvey 
called this two-phase search indirect search. Wixson [67] performed an analysis of 
the cost of searching for one object with indirect search as compared with direct 
search; he found indirect search to be more efficient in this case by a factor of 
2-8. 
As a vision system, Ulysses is most similar to intelligent agent control systems 
that use task-directed sensing. For example, Firby’s RAP (for “Reactive Action 
Package”) system [29] controls both perception and action for a robot. However, 
while this system may theoretically allow a designer to program complex visual 
search strategies, the reactive nature of RAPS seems better suited for simple 
sensing actions, Firby’s examples illustrate sensing operations that verify pre- 
conditions of actions--e.g., finding an object about to be manipulated. The RAP 
system and Ulysses-3 both use a time-stamped data base and simple models of 
growing uncertainty to help select perceptual actions. The model in the RAP 
system is simpler, though; it uses only the age of information instead of modeling 
the related uncertainty in position, velocity, etc. Chapman’s Sonja system [18] 
also reactively generates sensory actions. In contrast, Ulysses deliberates to try to 
find the optimum set of perceptual actions at each moment. We feel that this 
deliberation is a desirable step for automatically finding good sensing policies in 
complex situations, and that eventually the policies should be compiled into 
reactive rules. 
Ulysses’ use of deliberation to select perceptual actions is close in spirit to the 
body of work on decision-theoretic sensing (for example, [20, 31, 47, 591). These 
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systems deliberate in order to find the most cost-effective perceptual actions- 
actions that increase confidence in a hypothesis the most for the least cost. This 
approach contrasts with the deterministic selection approach of RAPS, Sonja, and 
Ulysses. While a probabilistic approach is attractive for a real-world problem, the 
hard constraints in our driving model suggested that a probabilistic decision tree 
would collapse to a deterministic one anyway. This is because we assume that the 
cost of having an accident is infinite. In addition, the probabilistic approach 
becomes computationally expensive in a complex domain like driving. 
1.3.2. Driving 
The driving task has been characterized as having three levels: strategic, tactical 
and operational [53]. These levels are illustrated in Table 1. Each level in general 
provides commands to the level below; the strategic level provides a route plan, a 
driving style, etc. to the tactical level, which in turn selects control behaviors for 
the operational level. While sophisticated planning programs and control systems 
have made substantial progress in automating the strategic and operational levels 
respectively, neither has addressed active perception. The strategic level is mostly 
symbolic so does not require high-bandwidth input from sensors, while the 
operational level does not require complex task planning and can rely on fixed 
sensing operations. 
Ulysses addresses the tactical level. Models of tactical driving have come mostly 
from the domain of human driving. Michon identified three types of tactical 
driving models: task analysis, information flow control, and motivational [.53]. 
Tusk analysis models (e.g., [SO]) divide driving into many subtasks and describe 
each. Unfortunately. a description of component tasks alone is not sufficient for 
building a driving model. This is because a task list does not address the dynamic 
relations between tasks. The list does not specify how the driver chooses a task in 
a given situation. or whether one task can interrupt another, or how two tasks 
might be performed simultaneously (especially if they require conflicting actions). 
Information flow control models are computer simulations of driving behavior. 
These simulations, such as SIMRO [19]. TEXAS [33], and NETSIM [28, 681, are 
capable of dynamically interleaving driving subtasks as required by the situation. 
However, these simulations are incomplete as driving models. For example, they 
Table I 
Characteristics of three levels of driving 
Examples Characteristics Existing model 
Strategic 
(high level) 
Tactical 
(mid level) 
Planning a route: 
Estimating trip tlmc 
Determining right 
of way: 
Passing another car 
Static; abstract 
Dynamic; physical 
Planning programs 
Human driving models 
Operational 
(low level) 
Tracking a lane: 
Following a car 
Feedback control Robot control systems 
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typically allow cars to change lanes instantly without having to drive across lane 
lines. These simulations do not represent other physical information such as road 
geometry, accurate vehicle location, or the location and appearance of traffic 
control devices (TCDs). Finally, these simulations do not address perception and 
do not contain knowledge of how to interpret traffic conditions from observable 
objects. 
Motivational models are theories of human cognitive activity during driving. 
These models generally describe mental states such as “intentions”, “expec- 
tancy”, “ perceived risk”, “target level of risk”, “need to hurry” or “distractions” 
(e.g., the models reviewed by van der Molen [66]). These states are combined 
with perceptions in various ways to produce actions. However, motivational 
models are typically not computational-they do not concretely show how to 
represent driving knowledge, how to perceive traffic situations, or how to process 
information to choose actions. Some researchers are now building computational 
models of human driving (for example, Aasman [2]). Ulysses is essentially a 
cognitive process model, but not modeled on human cognition. 
2. The computational cost of general perception 
As part of our study of selective perception, we have analyzed the cost of 
sensing the driving environment. This analysis serves two purposes: it illustrates 
why selective perception is essential in this domain, and it provides a basis for 
evaluating the selective perception techniques we introduce. While intuitive, 
qualitative arguments for selective perception indicate some benefits, the full 
impact of this approach is much more apparent when at least the order of 
magnitude of cost is known. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we have hypothesized a generic scene 
interpretation system that uses standard image processing and interpretation 
techniques. Although there are now many vision systems that can find roads and 
cars directly in front of or behind a robot, and signs along side the robot’s road, 
no one has yet built a complete system that can find all the objects needed for 
situation analysis (for example, [16, 34, 51, 691. The road-finding work is mostly 
directed at lane-keeping control; vehicle detection is used for car following and 
collision avoidance, and does not look for vehicles approaching intersections on 
side roads. 
We have analyzed the processing steps for exhaustively complete perception 
and developed a complexity expression that is polynomial in the number of pixels 
in the image. We estimated the coefficients of the polynomial from characteristics 
of the scene and of the processing algorithms. The number of pixels was estimated 
by analyzing the field of view and resolution necessary to see and recognize 
objects at the required ranges. The result is a numeric estimate of the number of 
operations necessary to perform the sensing. A detailed explanation of our cost 
model is contained in [56]. 
404 D.A. Keece, S.A. Shafer ’ Artificial Intelligence 78 (lYY5) 397-430 
2.1. The environment 
A general perception system has to find all traffic objects of potential interest to 
the planner. For the Ulysses driving model, these objects include roads regions, 
road markings, vehicles, traffic signs, and traffic signals. Road markings include 
lane lines, stop lines, arrows and letters. Vehicle velocity estimates are required. 
Traffic signs and signals must be detected even when they are turned away from 
the line of sight by about 45”. The robot must sometimes recognize Stop and 
Yield signs from the back at intersection [58]. The size of the object features 
determines the resolution needed to detect them, and the number of variations 
determines the number of models that must be matched against scene regions. We 
took the object characteristics from a standard highway design manual [27]. 
Since it is not practical to consider perceiving the entire world, we arbitrarily 
set a range limit on the sensor system. In some driving situations it may be 
desirable to see long distances ahead; for example, signals are supposed to be 
visible from 218m away on a road with 100 kph traffic [27, p. 4B-111, and the 
sight distance needed for passing is given as 30.5 m at this speed [l, p. 1471. While 
Ulysses is capable of driving on simulated highways, for this work we have 
concentrated on arterial urban streets where the environment is more diverse. 
Since streets have lower speeds than highways, we have chosen 150 m as the 
perceptual range limit. 
Our analysis of perceptual cost considers factors not explicitly represented in 
the environment modeled by PHAROS. The environment is assumed to have 
shadows, trees, clouds, occluding objects, textures, and reflections. These factors 
prevent us from using cheap recognition algorithms based on single, uniform 
features. For example, although standard traffic sign colors will be useful for 
segmenting out sign regions, there may be other signs or other objects that have 
the same colors. Additional information will be needed to distinguish the traffic 
signs from the other regions in the image. 
2.2. Object recognition procedures 
Our generic perception system has three main steps: feature extraction, model 
matching, and secondary matching. 
Feature extraction includes image transformation, image segmentation, and 
region property computation. Image transformation includes steps such as 
transforming color space, detecting edges, converting range data to local coordi- 
nates, or making correlations for optical flow. Transforming the image and 
computing region properties (e.g. texture, moments, average color, etc.) both 
require performing operations on each pixel in the image. Segmenting the 
transformed image to find regions not only involves operations on each pixel, but 
comparisons between pixels and regions and between regions when assigning 
pixels to regions. Based on experiments we have performed with images of 
outdoor scenes, we believe that the number of regions is generally proportional to 
the number of pixels. Thus the cost of segmentation has a component that 
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depends on the square of the number of pixels. We estimated the cost coefficients 
of these feature extraction algorithms from our experiences at CMU in perception 
for vehicle navigation and an examination of the literature [ll, 22, 26, 30, 37, 39, 
431. 
The model matching step involves matching S scene features to M object model 
features [lo]. The complexity is M ’ in the worst case, but can be reduced 
substantially by introducing heuristics such as constraints and object hierarchies 
[26, 351. The complexity of matching with heuristics is not fixed because it 
depends on how well the heuristics work in a given domain. We assumed that 
heuristics would prune the search tree strongly so that after two model features 
were matched only one scene feature would match each remaining model feature. 
In this case the complexity is only proportional to S3, which is roughly 
proportional to the number of pixels cubed. 
We assume a secondary matching step to find details on traffic objects that have 
been recognized in the primary model matching step. Two-step matching avoids 
having to examine the entire scene at high resolution. The cost of secondary 
matching is still comparable to primary matching, however, because the reduction 
in scene area is almost countered by the increase in resolution. Surface markings 
in particular require very high resolution to detect at maximum range. 
The resulting complexity expression for general driving perception is approxi- 
mately 
lO$ + p2 + 10-5p3 ) 
where p is the number of pixels in the image. 
(1) 
2.3. Pixel count 
The number of pixels in the processed image is basically determined by the 
required field of view and the required resolution. We assume that a general 
driving perception system would have to see 360” around the robot, but only 45” 
up and down. The angle subtended by a pixel must be no larger than the smallest 
required scene feature; we estimate that this will be a 30 cm patch of road. Such a 
patch subtends only (1.5 x 10-3)” at 150 m range when viewed from an assumed 
sensor height of 2m. We further assume that the perception system will take 
advantage of the fact that objects will be in a vertical range of about 0 to 7 m 
high. Thus when the sensors are pointing down at 45”, they are looking at 
markings that are very close (and therefore big). The system can thus use larger 
pixels at high and low sensor angles. The net result is that approximately 8.1 X lo7 
pixels are required to analyze the whole scene. Using this pixel count in Eq. (1) 
above, the total cost to analyze a single image is approximately 9 X lOi 
operations. 
Ulysses is assumed to process a new image every 100 milliseconds; so Ulysses 
would require about 10 ’ operations per second if it used naive, exhaustive 
perception. A “fast” computer that can perform a billion operations per second 
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would thus be almost 11 orders of magnitude too slow to analyze the scene. Even 
if these estimates are off by several orders of magnitude, it is clear that a general 
approach to perception is intractable and that the driving robot must sharply limit 
its perceptual focus of attention. 
3. A model of robot driving 
We are studying selective perception in the context of a real-world task: 
driving. Actually. we are developing selective perception together with a robot 
driving program because for this sort of real-world activity, perception is 
intimately linked to the task. This section describes our driving program, Ulysses 
[%I. The discussion here is devoted mostly to the task of selecting maneuvers; we 
describe perception control in later sections and refer to the system as Ulysses-l, 
-2. or -3. We begin by describing how some of the driving knowledge is encoded in 
Ulysses. Next we present the architecture of Ulysses. Finally, we describe 
PHAROS, the simulator used to develop and test Ulysses. 
3.1. Tactical driving knowledge 
Tactical driving is a complex task that requires the robot to consider roads, 
surface markings, signs. signals, and other vehicles in various locations. The 
meaning of these objects varies depending on where they are relative to the robot 
and each other. Some of this complexity is illustrated in Fig. 3. In this figure, the 
robot is required to yield by the nearby sign, but it must make a judgment about 
the distance, speed, and likely constraints on the vehicle to the right to decide 
whether it (the robot) should stop. In addition, if the robot does not stop, it must 
consider its intended maneuver. the signal and the approaching car at the next 
intersection. 
In our system, Ulysses controls robot maneuvers by repeatedly selecting an 
acceleration and a lane command for the robot. Ulysses’ driving knowledge is 
encoded in constraints and preferences for each of these commands. 
Constraints generally encode traffic and safety rules that limit the robot’s 
actions. For example, acceleration is constrained so that the robot speed stays 
below the speed limit, the robot does not enter an intersection when it does not 
have right of way, it can stop before the end of the known (detected) road, and it 
can slow down without hitting the car in front should that car brake. Lane choice 
is constrained by traffic in adjacent lanes, and the compatibility of the lanes’ 
allowed turn maneuvers with the robot’s intended maneuver. These constraints 
are combined by taking their logical intersection. 
Preferences select among the remaining allowed actions to further goals such as 
“go as fast as possible”. Of the allowed acceleration values remaining, Ulysses 
prefers the highest one. For lanes, traffic flow speeds in different lanes and 
intended turns at distant intersections determine preferences. Ulysses uses the 
relevant preference with the highest priority to make a final selection. This 
constraint- and preference-based knowledge representation scheme was inspired 
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Fig. 3. Example of a tactical driving task. A robot driver (R) is approaching a crossroad. 
by similar action selection mechanisms in other systems such as Soar [45] and 
Prodigy [ 171. 
Constraints operationalize not only traffic laws but “self-preservation” goals as 
well-staying on the road and avoiding collisions. These goals introduce basic 
acceleration constraints to avoid loss of control. For example, the robot’s speed is 
limited on curves so that the lateral acceleration is within the limits of the vehicle. 
This sort of constraint could be implemented at the operational level rather than 
requiring the tactical level to deliberate about it. However, safe driving often 
requires recognizing that conditions will change. Ulysses can do this by looking 
ahead for features. This prediction is not within the scope of operational control, 
especially if conditions are detected indirectly (e.g. by reading warning signs). 
The perception system may not be able to detect objects reliably beyond some 
range. Ulysses deals with this uncertainty by making two assumptions: first, that 
there is a known range within which perception is certain; and second, that 
objects and conditions that trigger constraints are always present just beyond this 
range. The latter assumption is the worst case and results in conservative 
decisions. For example, Ulysses always assumes that the road ends just beyond 
road-detection range. 
While the Ulysses driving model produces fairly good driving behavior, it still 
suffers from several limitations when compared to the general capabilities of 
humans. 
l Range of objects. Ulysses only understands a finite set of objects. It would 
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be unable to figure out the meaning of, say, a new traffic signal that used text 
or a new icon to indicate its meaning. Ulysses treats unknown objects 
(including bicyclists and pedestrians, currently) as obstacles to be avoided. 
Structural abstractions, Ulysses makes heavy use of the lane structure in 
roads. It would be unable to understand an open parking lot or take a 
shortcut across traffic lanes. It also makes use of TCD conventions, and 
would miss unconventionally located signs and markings (as would many 
humans). For example, Ulysses does not look on the left side of the road for 
signs. 
Perception. Ulysses assumes perfect perception, within the limits mentioned 
above. Allowing increased uncertainty requires addressing the idea of risk in 
driving. Section 7 discusses this further. 
Fixed parameters. Ulysses uses many fixed parameters: the braking capa- 
bility of the vehicle, the reaction time margin to allow other drivers, etc. A 
more sophisticated model would allow these to change as environmental and 
traffic conditions changed. 
Reasonable driver behavior. While Ulysses watches for other drivers making 
sudden lane changes and running red lights, it nevertheless assumes mostly 
reasonable driver behavior. It is always possible for the driver of an 
oncoming car to suddenly swerve a few feet and cause a head-on collision. 
Since there is no way to accommodate such behavior, Ulysses ignores the 
possibility. 
Driving program architecture 
Fig. 4 shows the basic structure of Ulysses and how it interfaces to the strategic 
and operational levels. The strategic level provides a route plan, while the 
operational level implements commands. In the current implementation routes 
Strategic Level 
Outside World 
Ulysses-x 
Select 
perception 
+ 
Look for traffic 
objects 
Ulysses ;............. Driving Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
j Generate Select accel and 
? constraints and lane; 
j preferences update state 
~...._....___...__........................ 
*Maintain accel *Follow lane 
Operational Level *Cross intersections *Change lane 
Fig. 4. Architecture of Ulysses and interface to other driving levels. 
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are created by a human operator and given directly to Ulysses. The plan is 
assumed to be based on an accurate map of the street network, so the desired 
maneuver at every intersection is known ahead of time. The operational level is 
currently assumed to be able to maintain a specified acceleration, follow a lane, 
drive to a lane across an intersection, and change lanes smoothly. This three-level 
architecture is analogous to robot control designs proposed by many other 
researchers to connect symbolic planning and numerical control functions (for 
example [6, 8, 32, 48, 521). 
The tactical driving program takes information about traffic objects and selects 
actions using constraints and preferences (see below). In Ulysses-l, -2, and -3, 
information about what has been seen so far is used to help select additional 
sensing actions. The route plan is used both to select maneuvers at intersections 
and to guide the selection of relevant traffic objects. The tactical level uses a 
simple model of operational level capabilities-maximum acceleration at different 
speeds, maximum braking rate, time to complete a lane change, etc.-so that it 
can produce commands that the operational level can execute. 
For this research the tactical level of the robot is assumed to execute a simple 
“sense-plan-act” cycle. At the beginning of the cycle, the robot senses the world; 
next, it chooses an action; and finally, it executes the action. Ulysses maintains 
only a few bits of state between cycles, getting fresh information each cycle by 
sensing. The cycle period is 100 milliseconds. We assume that the system can look 
for whatever it wants and finish deliberating within the 100 milliseconds. Such an 
ideal system can respond perfectly to changing situations in this domain-both 
because it will quickly notice anything that changes and will determine the best 
possible reaction (that it knows). At the same time, this system is very simple and 
allows us to concentrate on the issues of selective perception. 
An important question about such a simple, ideal system is how it relates to 
real systems. Can a robot really deliberate enough in 100 milliseconds to drive 
competently? AI planning research has dealt with deliberation complexity in a 
variety of ways-guaranteeing that action selection takes only bounded time (e.g. 
[42]), using algorithms that provide a coarse result at first and incrementally 
improve (e.g. [24]), reasoning about time required for planning (e.g. [40]), or 
speeding up performance over time (e.g. [12]). Robot builders, on the other 
hand, have often found that perceptual processing requires far more computation 
than “planning” on real mobile robots [61]. We have found that Ulysses’ decisions 
can easily be made in real time. Therefore in this research we assume that tactical 
driving decisions can be made in a short period without metareasoning about 
planning time, etc. 
3.3. Simulation environment 
In order to develop Ulysses, we have built a detailed, microscopic traffic 
simulator called PHAROS (for Public Highway And Road Simulator) [57]. 
PHAROS provided the usual benefits of simulation for experimentation: con- 
venience, controllability, repeatability, and safety. It also allowed us to explore 
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robot driving in parallel with efforts by others to develop operational control and 
perception for driving (see for example [64]). Another important function of 
PHAROS was to define the model of the physical, observable environment. 
Developing such a model is a necessary step in modeling the overall driving task. 
The environmental model determines what objects are important, how the world 
is abstracted, and what information can be obtained via perception. PHAROS 
uses a fairly detailed description of the street environment, including geometric 
information indicating the shape of streets, the appearance of road markings, the 
location of signs, and the configuration of traffic signals at intersections. 
Vehicles in PHAROS (which we call “zombies”) basically use the Ulysses 
driving model. There are two key differences, however. First, the zombies do not 
use perception, and in fact can look directly in the database to find information 
that would otherwise have to be inferred. Second, the zombies are intended to 
behave as humans would, so reaction delays are incorporated into their behavior. 
PHAROS has a network-based interface so that a robot driving program can 
control one vehicle in the simulation. The interface includes both perceptual 
queries and lane and acceleration commands. Ulysses therefore has a limited 
access to information in the environmental data base and cannot “cheat” to get 
unrealistic information. PHAROS generates an animated, bird’s eye view display 
of the vehicles. This graphical output provides us with our primary means of 
evaluating the behavior of both zombies and the robot. 
4. Ulysses-l: perceptual routines 
This section describes Ulysses-l, the simplest version of Ulysses. Ulysses-l 
incorporates a mechanism-perceptual routines-for the reasoning module to 
request specific perceptual actions to sense important objects. These routines are 
task-specific to allow the perception module to search the scene more efficiently. 
Below we explain what perceptual routines are and show how routines reduced 
perceptual cost in simulated driving situations. 
4.1. What are perceptual routines? 
Tactical driving requires information about spatial relations between objects. 
For example, a driver might want to know if there is a car approaching a 
downstream intersection from the right. There are at least two ways for a robot to 
find the objects in the desired relations. One way would be to detect all cars, and 
then test each car to see if it was on the road to the right at the intersection. “The 
road to the right” would itself be found by finding all roads and checking to see if 
they connected to the robot’s road at the intersection in question. This method 
would be very difficult because there may be many cars and roads in the robot’s 
field of view, and each one requires significant computation to find and test. 
Ulysses-l (and the later implementations of Ulysses as well) uses a different 
technique to detect specific objects in specific relations to one another. The 
D.A. Reece, S.A. Shafer I Artificial Intelligence 78 (1995) 397-430 411 
Table 2 
Perceptual routines in Ulysses-l 
Find-current-lane 
Track-lane 
Find-next-car-in-lane 
Find-intersection-approach-roads 
Find-crossing-cars 
Profile-road 
Find-next-lane-marking 
Find-path-in-intersection 
Find-signal 
Distance-between-marks 
Mark-adjacent-lane 
Find-next-sign 
Find-next-car-in-intersection 
Find-back-facing-signs 
perception subsystem uses the reference object and a relation to focus its search 
for a new object. In the example above the robot would use a routine perceptual 
action to look along the corridor ahead to the intersection, look to the right of the 
intersection to find the approach road, and then look along the road for a car. The 
car detection process is thus limited to a specific portion of the field of view, 
determined by the location of the road. This perception process is inherently 
sequential; the focus of attention moves across the image from or along a 
reference object until a target is located. Ulysses-l uses about a dozen of these 
routines, as shown in Table 2. Most of the routines mark objects and locations 
when they finish, so Ulysses-l can continue finding objects later. For example, the 
Track-lane routine stops scanning when an intersection is encountered (indicated 
by the change in lane lines in the well-marked PHAROS world), but marks the 
intersection so that Find-path-in-intersection, Find-signal, etc. can find objects 
relative to that intersection. 
Our perceptual routines are related to the visual routines proposed by Ullman 
to explain human vision [65]. These visual’ routines are composed of operations 
such as shifting processing focus, finding unique locations in the image, tracing the 
boundary of a contour, filling a region to a boundary, and marking points. The 
routines are invoked from the top-down when needed in different tasks. Agre and 
Chapman used visual routines in their video game-playing systems, Pengi [3] and 
Sonja [18]. In these systems the visual routines find objects with certain spatial 
relationships, for example “the block that the block I just kicked will collide 
with”. The routines in Ulysses-l assume more domain-dependent processes are 
available to the routines than is the case in Pengi; for example, the perceptual 
routines must understand how to look for a sign rather than just any object. 
The routines listed in Table 2 are specialized for the driving task. Perception 
systems for other tasks would clearly have to use routines specialized for those 
tasks. This idea of task-specific vision is similar to the task-oriented vision 
described by Ikeuchi and Hebert [41]. Although it may seem that driving 
decisions could be made with simpler, more general sensing functions, this is not 
generally true. For example, a low-level operator to “detect objects approaching 
’ We use the term “perceptual routines ” instead of “visual routines” in our work to emphasize that 
they may include higher levels than just low-level vision, and that they may include other sensing 
technologies. 
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from the right” could not determine which road the cars were on or whether they 
had the right of way. 
4.2. The cost of using routines 
The perceptual routines are subject to the same environmental conditions as a 
general, naive perception system, so must pay the same feature extraction costs. 
However, the use of routines can reduce perception costs in several ways: 
l Reduced search area. The azimuth and elevation angles swept by the routine 
are much smaller than the area searched by the naive perception system. 
l Range-limited resolution. The maximum depth reached in the routine’s 
search area limits the resolution required. 
l Object-limited resolution. The routines look for only one type of object at a 
time; resolution is determined by the size of that type, not by the smallest of 
all types. 
l Limited features. Since the routines look for only one type of object at a 
time, they may be able to use a small set of features that are specific to that 
object type. Only these features need to be extracted from the image. 
The effectiveness of these reductions depends on the situation; for example, if 
the robot used several routines to search the same area for different objects, it 
would not get the benefit of limited features or object-limited resolution. 
We can estimate the cost of perceptual routines by developing an expression 
that is dependent on the number of pixels, as we did in the previous section. We 
use the same general assumptions about feature extraction algorithms, sensor 
placement, traffic object characteristics, pixel sizes at various ranges, etc. that we 
used for the general perception system. However, since each routine looks for 
specific traffic objects, each uses different values for some parameters in the cost 
equation. For example, routines that search only for features on the road use 
smaller coefficients for the p and p2 terms to reflect the reduced complexity of 
understanding two-dimensional features in a plane. Further details of the cost 
expression for individual routines are given in [56]. 
Once we have an expression for the cost of each routine, the number of pixels 
processed can be plugged in to compute cost. However, since the number of 
pixels depends on the area of the scene actually scanned, the cost of the routine 
depends on the particular situation. The perceptual interface in PHAROS is able 
to determine the extent of a routine’s scan area and estimate the number of pixels 
required to examine it; thus we can measure the dynamic cost of routines in 
simulated driving situations. 
4.3. A driving scenario 
We can now show how the estimated perceptual cost varies continuously during 
driving. We have created a situation in which the robot is driving on a four-lane 
artery and must turn left on a side road. The scenario requires the robot to 
Fig. 5. Left side road scenario (not to scale). 
change lanes, wait for oncoming traffic to pass, and then make the left turn. Fig. 5 
shows the situation and the path of the robot. 
Fig. 6 is a graph of the estimated perceptual cost over time for the left turn 
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scenario. The numbers in this figure correspond to reference points in Fig. 5. The 
cost of perception is dominated by the lane search cost, which in the figure is 
indistinguishable from the “Total cost” curve. Searching the lane is the most 
costly type of activity because foreshortened lane and stop lines are the smallest 
objects in the environment. Since Ulysses-l sometimes has to search out to its 
sensor range limits, the cost of finding lanes can be very high. 
The perceptual cost before point (1) is approximately 1.5 X 1017 operations per 
second; this represents the cost of a four-lane highway without intersections. At 
point (l), the sensors detect the intersection and trigger additional searches for 
signals, approach roads, and blocking cars. The figure shows that the signal and 
car search cost jumps up here. Ulysses-l also determines that the robot cannot 
turn left from the right lane and begins a lane change. During this time, the robot 
stops searching the adjacent lane for traffic, so the cost of searching lanes drops 
sharply. At point (2), the sensors detect the robot’s corridor on the far side of the 
intersection and begin searching for signs and cars on that road. At (3) the 
sensors can detect all approach roads, so the robot begins to search these roads 
for lanes, cars, and backward-facing Stop and Yield signs. After the lane change 
is complete at (4) the robot again watches both lanes of the road and the lane 
search cost increases accordingly. At point (5) the robot enters the intersection 
and ceases its search for signals. approaching cars, and other objects that would 
affect its right-of-way decision. At (6) the robot no longer needs to look for 
unexpected cross traffic in the intersection either. 
In addition to this scenario, we have created several other driving situations and 
used Ulysses-l to drive a robot through them [56]. They include the following: 
l A four-way intersection with no traffic control (unordered intersection). This 
illustrates visual search for different right-of-way logic. 
l A four-lane highway with no intersections. This scenario removes the 
complication of intersections, but includes car following and passing actions. 
l An intersection of four-lane roads controlled by traffic lights. This scenario 
includes many signs and markings and more cars than the other scenarios. It 
also illustrates an intersection with completely different traffic control. 
l A set of closely spaced intersections of two-lane roads. This scenario includes 
Stop and Yield signs for the robot, and requires consideration of two 
downstream intersections at once. There is also an intersection on an 
approach road to complicate the search for conflicting cars. 
4.4. Summary 
The Ulysses-l driving system introduces a language for controlling perception. 
This language is a collection of perceptual routines, each of which performs a 
specific, limited perceptual action. Routines do not search the entire scene for 
their target objects, but instead search in specific places relative to other objects. 
The routines are task-specific, because the reasoning component depends on the 
semantics of this relative search to get the right objects in the scene. The 
reasoning component of the system can thus avoid doing the spatial reasoning by 
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pushing it off on the perception component; the routines do the spatial reasoning 
implicitly in their search of the physical world. 
The perceptual routines significantly reduce the cost of perception. Experi- 
ments in simulated driving situations indicate that routines require about 1017 
operations per second, as compared with about 10” operations per second 
necessary for general, bottom-up perception. Thus even before Ulysses reasons 
about what the most critical objects are, perceptual cost can be reduced by three 
orders of magnitude by using perceptual routines. 
5. Ulysses-2: ignoring redundant constraints 
The previous section described how perceptual routines can sharply limit where 
the perception system has to look for specific objects in the scene. However, 
Ulysses-l still asks the perception system to look for everything that could 
possibly generate a constraint or preference. In the second implementation of the 
driving system, Ulysses-2, the reasoning component requests only enough objects 
to determine a unique action for the robot. Ulysses-2 takes advantage of the 
specificity of perceptual routines to find one object at a time. Perceptual routines 
are called sequentially in an efficient order. 
The main idea of Ulysses-2 can be illustrated with an example. Consider the 
robot driver approaching the intersection in Fig. 7. The robot has not looked for 
objects in the regions indicated with question marks-cars in the lane in front of it 
and on the side streets, and speed limit signs along the side of the road. Each of 
these could generate constraints on the robot’s acceleration. In the worst case, a 
“Speed Limit 15” sign would force the robot to drive at 15 mph starting at the 
beginning of the unknown region. For cars, the worst case would be a car stopped 
in the road in front of the robot, or committed to enter the intersection from the 
side road. A car stopped in front of the robot at the beginning of the unknown 
area would impose the hardest constraint on the robot (i.e. force it to decelerate 
the most). Intuitively, the robot should look there first. 
Continuing with the example, suppose that the robot looked and found a car in 
its lane stopped at the intersection. This is far enough away that the robot might 
be forced to look for a Speed Limit sign anyway; slowing to 15 mph nearby might 
require more deceleration than slowing to a stop near the intersection. However, 
since the robot has to stop before the intersection anyway, it does not yet have to 
look for cars on the cross streets. This section explains how Ulysses-2 implements 
the above reasoning process. 
5.1. The corridor 
Ulysses-l generates constraints from objects around a corridor-the intended 
path down roads and through intersections. In Ulysses-2 the concept of a corridor 
is made more explicit in a network of frames [54]. Each section of road and 
intersection is a frame with slots for signs, markings, cars, signals, adjacent road 
416 D.A. Reece. S.A. Shafer ! Arrificial lnreliigence 78 (1995) 397-430 
Fig. 7. This robot approaching the intersection has not yet looked for cars or signs in the regions 
marked by “‘?“. 
sections and intersections. etc. Many slots point to lists to allow variable numbers 
of these objects. The slots correspond to traffic objects that generate constraints 
and preferences; they are connected to the inputs of the inference trees described 
below. 
At the beginning of every decision cycle, Ulysses-2 starts with frames with 
empty slots. The perceptual selection process requests that various slots be filled 
in order to determine the effects of the corresponding constraints. When such a 
request is made, a demon in the slot requests an appropriate perceptual routine to 
look for an object. The results of the routine update slots and sometimes cause 
the corridor frame network to be expanded as new road sections are discovered. 
5.2. The inference tree 
Ulysses-2 represents driving knowledge explicitly so that it can reason about 
how sensory data affects the choice of actions. The knowledge is encoded in two 
inference trees that transform inputs (sensed data) to outputs (acceleration and 
lane choice). This transformation is a complex function that comprises many 
component functions--hence, a tree of connected function nodes. Ulysses’ 
inference trees include nodes that implement arithmetic operations, logical 
relations, set functions, and production rules. In general such functions would 
allow any action selection mechanism to be implemented. 
Nodes can represent uncertainty in their output values. For continuous 
functions, uncertainty is represented as an interval of values; for nodes with 
discrete (symbolic) functions, uncertainty is represented with a set of symbols. In 
order to help keep the choice of perceptual actions unambiguous, and to aid in 
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the efficient representation of the sets, we used ordered sets of symbols in the 
nodes. For example, it is possible to order traffic control indications as follows: 
Green, Yield, Stop, Red. We have defined appropriate uncertain-value propaga- 
tion mechanisms for all of the continuous and discrete functions. 
The nodes at the input of the trees use default uncertainty bounds for their 
input values when the attached corridor frame slots are empty. The default 
bounds are worst case, so that the sensed values will fall between the bounds. 
These defaults are domain-dependent. 
Each node has an update demon attached to it which executes when the node 
value is updated. These demons can add new nodes to the tree to accommodate 
new parts of the corridor structure that are added when more of the environment 
is sensed. 
The inference trees can be viewed as one-way constraint propagation networks, 
with bounds on the inputs being propagated to the output through the node 
functions. The inputs are sensory data, so the inference trees in effect translate a 
range of possible world states into a range of robot actions. The goal of Ulysses-2 
is to find the minimum set of objects to sense that will reduce the uncertainty in 
the output to one unique action. 
5.3. The search algorithm 
Ulysses-2 begins each decision cycle with the worst-case, default input values 
propagated through the tree to the output. The output value thus presents a wide 
range of possible actions. As long as the output does not specify a unique action, 
Ulysses-2 repeatedly searches the tree to find another perceptual routine to run to 
get more information. The algorithm is as follows: 
procedure ChooseAction (tree) { 
while tree output is not a single value { 
next-rdutine+Evaluate (tree); 
Execute (next-routine); 
PropagateNewInputValues (tree); 
1) 
where the next perceptual routine is chosen in a recursive tree evaluation: 
function Evaluate (node) { 
if node is an input node 
return (demon for corridor slot connected to this node); 
else { 
child-node+ChooseCriticalInput(node); 
return (Evaluate(child-node)) ; 
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The key part of the recursive tree evaluation is the selection of the critical node 
input. Ulysses-2 looks for an input that dominates all of the others in determining 
the value of the node. For example, of the inputs to a node that computes the 
Maximum function, the input with the highest upper bound alone determines the 
upper bound of the Max node. Since this input must be evaluated before the 
value of the Max node can be completely determined, that input is selected for 
evaluation first. Not all node functions have such a dominating input; for these, 
Ulysses-2 selects an input according to a default ordering (which is chosen to give 
good performance for this task). Ulysses-2 can nevertheless find good sequences 
of perceptual actions because the nodes at the top of its trees do have dominating 
inputs. This fact is due to the encoding of knowledge Ulysses uses, with ordered 
preferences used to select actions. 
5.4. Experimental results 
The Ulysses-2 system was run on the same scenarios used to test Ulysses-l. The 
intent was for Ulysses-2 to make the same decisions (for acceleration and lane 
choice) as Ulysses-l. In all of the scenarios, Ulysses-2 indeed produced the exact 
same acceleration and lane commands at exactly the same time as Ulysses-l. And 
as the following results show. Ulysses-2 makes fewer perceptual requests. 
Fig. 8 provides a comparison between the perceptual costs in Ulysses-l and in 
Ulysses-2 in the left-side road scenario shown in Fig. 5. Initially Ulysses-2 is 
cheaper because it does not needlessly examine the adjacent lane for traffic, signs, 
etc. The information Ulysses-2 collects early in the decision cycle selects the 
current lane as the preferred one, and the adjacent lane is ignored. When the 
intersection is detected. the cost decreases steadily because the robot is getting 
closer to the intersection and looking at less and less road in front of it. Ulysses-2 
does not yet look at or beyond the intersection because it would not make any 
difference in the robot’s actions. At around t = 47, the approaching car enters the 
intersection. Since the intersection is searched before the approach roads, finding 
a car here allows Ulysses-2 to ignore the approach roads; hence the cost is much 
lower than for Ulysses-l. At t = SO Ulysses has determined that the approaches 
are clear and enters the intersection; perceptual cost drops dramatically because 
the approach roads are no longer being scanned. 
5.5. Related work 
Ulysses-2 makes use of bounds propagation and tree search to select sensing 
functions. While both of these mechanisms have roots in previous work, Ulysses-2 
extends them and combines them in a novel way. The propagation of numerical 
intervals through functions has been explored extensively in “constraint propaga- 
tion” systems [23]. For example. as part of a system for arithmetic reasoning, 
Simmons [62] implemented the same arithmetic interval propagation functions 
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used in Ulysses-2. He demonstrated that unusual numerical functions could be 
handled with the same basic ideas. Ulysses-2 also goes beyond the basic 
arithmetic functions, and furthermore includes Boolean operators, predicate 
functions, conditional expressions, etc. 
The tree search algorithm can be thought of as an extension of branch-and- 
bound (BB) search [46]. BB represents the uncertainty of unexplored branches 
with intervals and looks for dominating inputs. While BB trees have only Max (or 
only Min) nodes in them, B* [9] can search a game tree with both Min and Max 
nodes. Ulysses-2 used Min and Max nodes, and extends the concept to other 
arithmetic and symbolic functions as well. 
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5.6. Summary 
Ulysses-2 implements the Ulysses driving model with explicit data structures-a 
network of frames to model the world and an inference tree to encode the driving 
knowledge. Ulysses-2 selects perceptual actions by repeatedly evaluating the tree 
to determine the next most critical fact to sense. The most critical input is often 
uniquely determined by the extreme inputs to functions such as Max and Min. 
This evaluation is very effective because at the top of the inference trees, the 
driving model always includes some prioritizing knowledge-+xpressed in, e.g., 
Min and Max functions-to rank possible actions. Thus tree branches can be 
pruned near the top, thereby eliminating a lot of potential sensing. We conjecture 
that many task descriptions share this characteristic and would thus benefit 
similarly from this search technique. 
Fig. 8 shows the effectiveness of Ulysses-2 in the left-side road scenario. In 
situations in which there is little choice of action, and few constraints on the robot 
(such as the two-lane highway beyond the intersection), Ulysses-2 shows no 
improvement over Ulysses-l. When there is a choice of lanes, Ulysses-2 offers 
about an order of magnitude of improvement because it prunes away the 
unnecessary search of the adjacent lane. Ulysses-2 makes its biggest impact when 
there are several factors that could significantly constrain the robot’s action. In all 
scenarios that contained an intersection, Ulysses-2 was at times able to find a 
constraining condition quickly and stop sensing. This resulted in a cost savings of 
from one to six orders of magnitude over Ulysses-l. 
6. Ulysses-3: modeling world dynamics 
The first two versions of the driving program reduce the perceptual oad on the 
robot when it looks at the world each decision cycle. However, both Ulysses-l 
and Ulysses-2 throw away all information between cycles. The third implementa- 
tion of the driving program, Ulysses-3, takes advantage of coherence in the world 
over time to further reduce the information it needs to sense. Knowledge about 
how each object can change is stored in the inference tee with the input node for 
that object, and Ulysses-3 automatically determines when the robot needs to 
sense that object again. 
6. I. Algorithm modifications 
Ulysses-3 uses almost the same data structures and search algorithms as 
Ulysses-2. However, the slots in the corridor frames do not start the decision 
cycle empty. Instead, they retain their values from the previous cycle. A time 
stamp is added to indicate their ages. The nodes at the inputs to the inference tree 
do not simply use default values (or uncertainty intervals) at the beginning of the 
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cycle; now, an initialization program in the input node examines the associated 
slot value and its age and computes new uncertainty bounds. As in Ulysses-2, 
these bounds represent the worst case. 
The initialization programs encode knowledge about domain dynamics. Some 
slots’ bounds can be fixed with high confidence over time, while others may 
change predictably or unpredictably between cycles. For example, the type of a 
sign does not change over time. The range to the sign decreases predictably 
according to the motion of the robot. The range to the closest car ahead of the 
robot is unpredictable; it is presumably possible for a car to change lanes and “cut 
off” the robot at any time. The driving model cannot yet predict when such a lane 
change could occur, so Ulysses-3 must find the lead car from scratch every 
decision cycle. 
6.2. Experimental results 
Ulysses-3 was used to drive the simulated robot through the same scenarios that 
were used for Ulysses-l and Ulysses-2. Ulysses-3 produced the exact same 
acceleration and lane commands as the earlier versions. Fig. 9 shows the 
perceptual cost during the left-side road scenario and compares it with the costs 
using Ulysses-2. In general, Ulysses-3 reduces perceptual cost significantly. 
Before the intersection is detected at t = 37.5, the Ulysses-3 search cost is 
usually between 1Or1 and 101’. This is much less than for Ulysses-2 (lOI or so) 
because Ulysses-3 is looking only for new pieces of road that it could not see in 
the last decision cycle (i.e., a piece of road at the sensor range limits). The spikes 
in cost occur when Ulysses-3 makes a search along the road ahead for the next 
sign. If this next sign is far ahead, then Ulysses-3 is able to wait some time before 
extending its sign horizon again. 
When the intersection is detected there is one decision cycle of high cost as 
Ulysses-3 considers changing lanes. Cost drops during the lane change because 
Ulysses-3 temporarily stops checking for an intersection in the distance. There is 
another spike at about t = 41.5 when the robot finishes the lane change as 
Ulysses-3 makes sure there is no lane farther to the left. Otherwise, Ulysses-3 
does not have to look for lanes or signs or signals again until the intersection 
becomes important at t = 43. At this point there is a sharp increase in cost 
because Ulysses-3 looks for many objects while it analyzes the intersection. 
However, Ulysses-3 looks only once for signs and signals at the intersection. After 
the spike, the cost drops again for several seconds. This indicates that although 
Ulysses-3 has found the approaching car, it does not keep looking at the car 
because it knows the car cannot yet be at the intersection. Ulysses-3 does not look 
for the car again until about t = 46. 
When the car finally clears the intersection, Ulysses-3 makes one last check for 
approaching traffic before deciding to go through the intersection. This check is 
reflected in the spike in cost at t = 48.5, When the robot enters the downstream 
lane, search costs have a similar character to those on the approach road. 
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Fig. 9. Total perceptual cost ot Ulysses-3 compared to Ulysses-2 for the left-side road scenario. 
However, the cost on the two-lane road is cheaper than on the four-lane road 
because the robot does not have to consider changing lanes and therefore does 
not continually search for downstream intersections. The spikes occur when 
Ulysses-3 extends its road or sign horizon in jumps. 
The impact of explicitly modeling world dynamics is quite significant. The 
experimental results show that most of the time, the cost for Ulysses-3 is between 
5 and 7 orders of magnitude less than for Ulysses-2. This savings is primarily the 
result of remembering static objects-roads and signs. Ulysses-3 also performs 
much better than Ulysses-2 when constraints come from somewhat predictable 
objects such as cross traffic. Typically, Ulysses-3 has cost spikes at intervals of 
D.A. Reece, S.A. Shafer I Art$cial Intelligence 78 (1995) 397-430 423 
several seconds that reach Ulysses-2 levels; these spikes occur when the program 
must analyze a new situation or when the uncertainty about a critical object has 
grown too large. The next section discusses possible ways to reduce the magnitude 
of these spikes. 
7. Discussion 
7.1. Net effect of selective perception 
Fig. 10 illustrates the cost of perception in the left-side road scenario for naive, 
general perception and for all of the Ulysses implementations. On the right side 
of the graph, the average cost rate over the whole scenario (i.e., about 32 
seconds) is given for the three implementations. The minimum cost, incurred just 
to identify the road in front of the robot, is also indicated in the figure. Most of 
the time, Ulysses-3 requires about seven orders of magnitude less computation 
than Ulysses-l, and about 10 orders of magnitude less than an unguided general 
perception system. When the cost of the “spikes” of Ulysses-3 is averaged over 
the whole scenario, Ulysses-3 is still two orders of magnitude cheaper than 
Ulysses-l, and over five orders of magnitude cheaper than general perception. 
The approximate capabilities of some computers is also indicated in the figure. 
We have placed the computers a little low in the plot because the perceptual cost 
estimates did not really address data transfer costs, which would occupy some 
computer power. The “fast” computer is a hypothetical one delivering lo9 
operations per second. The approximation for the Navlab with a Warp systolic 
array processor was taken from Clune et al. [21]. Although the “fast” computer is 
almost fast enough to keep up with the requirements of Ulysses-3 most of the 
time, when the spikes are averaged in the cost is still too high by over five orders 
of magnitude. This discrepancy suggests that additional techniques should be 
found to reduce the cost of the spikes. 
7.2. Reducing peak costs 
A comparison of the instantaneous and average costs for Ulysses-3 in Fig. 10 
indicates that most of the cost is in the spikes, Furthermore, the peaks of the 
spikes in Ulysses-3 reach the cost levels of Ulysses-2. Thus if the robot were 
required to have the capacity to handle the maximum instantaneous load, it would 
need the same resources as the Ulysses-2 system; nothing would be gained in 
Ulysses-3. However, it would not be difficult, using the inference trees, to 
amortize the spikes over time and limit peak cost, For example, suppose that the 
available computation in each decision cycle were limited. The limit might 
represent processing limits or mechanical imits-pan rate, zoom rate, etc. The 
action selection process would stop when it hit the limit, even if not complete. 
Since the sense nodes are always initialized to worst-case values, and sensing only 
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Fig. 10. Perceptual cost for all implementations ot Ulysses in the left-side road scenario. Dotted line 
indicates the estimated cost for finding the lane in front of the robot. This operation is not under 
control of Ulysses-2 or -3; thus it represents the minimum cost these implementations can achieve. 
improves the performance of the task, stopping before completion leaves 
pessimistic (safe) constraints in the tree. Ulysses-3’ would select the available 
action with the lowest currently possible preference priority (i.e., the current 
default preference). For acceleration this would be the highest upper value 
allowed by the pessimistic constraints; for lane changing the result would often, 
but not always, be to stay in the same lane. The effect would be to slow the robot 
down until it could see all that it needed to in order to proceed safely. 
Ulysses-3, and the extension just described, performs “lazy perception” to save 
computation-i.e.. it only looks for things when absolutely necessary. Another 
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way to reduce peak costs would be to use excess capacity to look for things before 
it is strictly necessary. Advance estimates could avoid the need to slow the robot 
while the perception system is catching up. Such predictive perception could be 
guided with the inference tree by projecting the value of uncertain sense nodes 
into the future and finding out which ones would impact the value of the top 
node. 
Peak costs, and in some cases continuous costs, could also be reduced by using 
a tracking perceptual routine that simply watches one object continuously 
(between decision cycles). Tacking objects would be relatively inexpensive, since 
it involves no reasoning about spatial relations between traffic objects, no 
sequential scanning, and no complex model matching. By tracking a car ap- 
proaching an intersection, for example, Ulysses-3+ would not have to search for 
the car again when pessimistic position estimates placed it near the intersection. 
Instead, Ulysses-3+ could wait until the vehicle had actually reached the 
intersection and then look for more cars. Similarly, at signalized intersections 
Ulysses-3+ would not have to find and interpret signals every decision cycle; a 
tracking routine could easily fix itself on the appropriate signal head. 
7.3. Balancing correctness, cost, and performance 
The height of the sensing peaks in Fig. 10 could also be reduced by reducing the 
“correctness” instead of performance. Correct driving, according to Ulysses, 
means always considering all constraints in the model. Ulysses is intended to 
generate safe actions for the robot when all constraints are applied. If, because of 
resource limits, occhsion, or other sensor limitations, Ulysses-3 could not 
determine some fact, Ulysses-3 would slow the robotaegrade its performance- 
rather than ignore a constraint. For example, if there was limited sight distance at 
an intersection and the robot could not see up a side road, Ulysses-3 would always 
assume that there could be a car on the side road and prepare the robot to stop. 
This conservatism could get extreme; if Ulysses included the notion of children 
spontaneously running into the street, Ulysses-3 would force the robot to creep by 
all parked cars just in case a child was hiding behind one. 
It is interesting to note that humans often do not reduce their performance in 
similar conditions. Humans clearly do not look at everything of importance in the 
driving environment, because they have collisions with objects that they could 
have avoided if they had anticipated them. There are two observations we can 
make about human visual search and Ulysses. For example, humans have a 
limited field of view. The location of “human vision” in Fig. 10 (estimated from 
[55]) also suggests that humans do much less processing than the Ulysses model 
requires. Human peripheral vision helps to cover some situations by flagging 
moving and colorful objects for attention, but it is doubtful that it can cover all of 
the Ulysses constraints thoroughly. Second, humans make assumptions about the 
likelihood of various traffic situations, and selectively ignore possibilities if they 
seem unlikely. Thus humans can choose to ignore the possibility of children 
hiding behind parked cars, ignore the possibility of cars on minor side roads, 
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assume that the car they are tailgating won’t stop suddenly, overdrive their 
headlights, etc. Of course, human expectations are occasionally violated and they 
have accidents. 
If a driving robot is ever to achieve human-level performance-i.e., drive at 
similar speeds in similar situations-it will also have to accept the risks that 
humans accept. This risk tradeoff could possibly be incorporated into a driving 
program using decision theory. Robot speed (or lack thereof) and accidents would 
contribute to cost, and domain knowledge or learned experience would provide 
probability estimates for observable conditions. In each decision cycle, the driving 
program would have to incrementally select perceptual actions to provide the 
most information given the time available, and then select the motor actions that 
were expected to be the most cost-effective. Unfortunately, there are several 
difficulties with a decision-theoretic approach. First, with many constraints and 
many sensing options, the complexity of finding the best next action could be 
overwhelming. Second, probability distributions for various events and conditions 
could be very difficult to estimate. And finally, it is not clear what cost to assign 
an accident, especially one that damages property other than the robot. The 
driving system described in this paper effectively assigned infinite cost to 
accidents. This last question has philosophical ramifications that go beyond the 
technical problems. 
8. Conclusions 
This paper addresses the problem of efficiently controlling perception for a 
complex task. We have developed a driving control system that defines useful 
perceptual operations and a mechanism for integrating perception control with 
situation assessment and action selection. The system was implemented in three 
stages. Ulysses-l defined the perceptual operations and provided the basic 
connection between reasoning and perception that allows reasoning to request 
sensing actions. These operations, called perceptual routines, allow the reasoning 
component to request specific types of objects that are semantically important for 
driving decisions. At the same time they guide the perception component in its 
physical search for these objects. Ulysses-2 reasons about worst-case bounds on 
unknown conditions in the world. Ulysses-2 looks for objects in the order of their 
potential impact on robot actions, and stops sensing when further information 
cannot affect the choice of action. There are three main components of the 
perceptual reasoning mechanism: a frame-like data structure for encoding 
structure in the environment; a constraint-propagating inference tree to encode 
the action selection knowledge; and a search algorithm for efficiently selecting 
critical tree leaves to evaluate (objects to sense). Finally, Ulysses-3 takes 
advantage of coherence in the domain over time. Information is retained between 
decision cycles, and domain dynamics are encoded in update routines which 
increase the uncertainty in facts as they get older. 
The effect of these perceptual control mechanisms is dramatic. The three 
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versions of Ulysses were used to drive a simulated robot through several different 
situations. Ulysses-l immediately dropped the estimated cost of perception by 
three to four orders of magnitude compared with bottom-up perception. The 
impact of Ulysses-2 varied more with the moment; in situations near intersections 
where there was often an obvious constraint on robot actions, the estimated 
perceptual cost dropped an additional three to six orders of magnitude. Ulysses-3 
had an even bigger impact. Most of the time the estimated cost for Ulysses-3 was 
five to seven orders of magnitude below that for Ulysses-2, with momentary 
jumps every couple of seconds as the system looked around to reduce the growing 
uncertainty. On average, Ulysses-3 required about five orders of magnitude fewer 
arithmetic operations per second than did naive, bottom-up perception. 
Our eventual goal is to drive a real robot. Further reductions in perceptual cost 
will be necessary to achieve this goal. As discussed in the previous section, the 
mechanism of Ulysses can be extended to limit the peak costs of perception and 
significantly reduce the average cost. Additional perceptual operations, such as 
tracking, have the potential to reduce cost even further. The results of using these 
perceptual attention control mechanisms give us confidence that the perception 
problem for driving is tractable and perhaps within the capability of computing 
systems of the near future. 
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